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What is a "Vessel" in Admiralty Law?
Donald W. Peters*
R OBINSON, IN His BooK ON admiralty,' gives as a definition of
a vessel the following: "By statutory definition the word
vessel includes every description of water craft used or capable
of being used as a means of transportation on water. In fact,
neither size, form, equipment or means of propulsion are deter-
minative factors upon the question of jurisdiction, which regards
only the purpose for which the craft was constructed and the
business in which it is engaged." Then, is an airplane a vessel?
-a raft? -a Regulus guided missile? -a ferry dock-float?
Any structure made to float upon the water for the purpose
of commerce or war, whether impelled by wind, steam or oars-
this is the explanation of a vessel given in the American-English
Encyclopedia of Law.2
A vessel has been further defined in the Revised Statutes
of the United States as including every description of watercraft
or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as
a means of transportation by water.
A controversial question however, that often creates con-
fusion, is this: When, during the course of construction, is a
craft considered to be a full-fledged vessel.3 Theories and ap-
plications of maritime laws of foreign countries, on this as on
other points, are often deprecated by the courts of the United
States. And to further complicate matters, there may be a
definite variance between the treatment of the same waterborne
structure in contract and in tort. Moreover, a decisive split exists
between the United States and foreign maritime law as to the
actual birth of a vessel.
As to the controversy regarding contract or tort jurisdic-
tion, it has been held that during the construction of a craft
which unquestionably will be a vessel, at any specific time before
completion it is not considered to be a definite vessel. Maritime
flavor thus is absent from a contract for work done on a craft,
even after it has been launched into its environment.
* Graduate of Fenn College, with B.BA. degree; and a third year student
at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 Robinson, Handbook of Admiralty Law in the United States, 42 (1939 ed.).
2 Second Edition, 1929.
8 Benedict on Admiralty, Vol. I, 107-120 (1940 ed.).
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Arguing for admiralty jurisdiction in tort, stands the case of
Grant-Smith Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde. 4 There an employee was
accidentally injured while aboard a newly launched vessel. It
was held that this action fell under the authority of the Ad-
miralty Court5 (e.g., in tort).
There often are instances where partially constructed craft
must be towed to a distant yard. If, while enroute, the incom-
plete craft has a collision, the courts will hold that the craft can
be considered enough of a "vessel" to incur a maritime lien,
though the structure did not qualify as a complete vessel for an
action in libel for her own finishing. In effect, this means that the
craft would be eligible for being sued for damages inflicted while
in transit from one yard to another. But the contractors who
performed the construction presumably would not bring suit
for monetary compensation if the owners failed in business.
At the present time, almost all traditional sea codes regard
a contract for building a ship as a maritime contract. But, as
stated before, this theory is not applicable to the United States.
Benedict, the classic admiralty authority, says that a ship is
born when it is launched. He further makes the point that a
ship-building contract is non-maritime; and this conclusion has
become a part of admiralty jurisprudence.
This doctrine may become quite confusing when a major
building task is involved. Many ship alteration contracts fre-
quently refer to rebuilding. Thus, a ship may be dry-docked, cut
in half, and drawn apart, after which a new section is inserted.
Then, too, new propelling equipment may be necessitated, and
additional accommodations added, such as a new deck, and other
revamping that exceeds the original cost of the craft. A contract
of this nature would be construed as maritime, and the facts in
these situations would contribute to the factors decisive of
whether or not it then is a vessel.
In almost every actual case, the determination of "When is
a vessel a vessel?" creates difficulties and leads to fine-point
divisions.
Admiralty Court Decisions
The primary force which motivates the decisions of the
Admiralty Courts on this subject is the need for clarification of
4 Grant-Smith Porter Co. v. Rohde, 275 U. S. 469, 42 S. Ct. 157, 66 L. Ed.
321 (certif. from C. C. A. 9, 1922).
5 Ibid., n. 4.
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the question whether or not the craft is to fall within the defini-
tion of a vessel. Before the Admiralty Court will decide a
specific case, it usually must determine whether or not the case
is one within its admiralty jurisdiction. To further complicate
matters, the courts are expected to rule on cases ranging from a
raft to a super-dreadnaught. In essence, the major question that
usually is posed is: "What is a vessel?"
To demonstrate the difficult problems that have and may
arise, it is desirable to present some actual cases and principles
that have confronted the courts.
Case No. 1
A company bound numerous lengths of timber together in
the form of a raft, and floated the mass, as a convenient mode of
taking the timber to market. This raft, carrying a pilot, crew
and cook, who lived and were sheltered thereon during the
many-days voyage, was considered to be a vessel. The raft was
propelled by oars, poles and the tides. Declaring it to be a vessel
gave jurisdiction to admiralty, when there was a libel in rem
against it for a collision in navigable waters.6
In a case involving salvage services and a raft, it was held
that such services were performed when a raft of lumber was
rescued from peril in navigable waters. A claim for such services
may be sought in admiralty courts, because this craft would fall
within the definition of a vessel
7
In another such case a raft was considered to be a vessel
and was compelled to display lights while traveling at night.
By statute, a raft lacking such lights is subject to seizure if it
comes within the jurisdiction of admiralty, providing that the
seizure is properly executed.8
Case No. 2
Often times a split in opinion will arise as to whether or not
a craft is a vessel for maritime purposes. The arguments used
for denial of vessel status often have been based on the fact that
the craft were used and operated in small areas, and that the
craft were small in size. But these arguments generally have
been unheeded by the courts, because the fact that they were
6 Muntz v. A Raft of Timber, 15 F. 555 (C. C., E. D. La. 1883).
7 United States v. One Raft of Timber, 13 F. 796 (C. C., So. Car., 1882).
8 Admiralty, Revised Statute 4233, 4234-Concerning Rafts.
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engaging in, and aiding, commerce upon navigable waters was
sufficient to create jurisdiction.9 Yet, some other cases have
held otherwise. A mere float or lighter, however, was held to
come within the jurisdiction of the court.10 So was a barge with-
out sails or rudder,1 1 used for transporting brick, on which men
were employed, in a claim for wages of the men.
A floating pontoon,'1 2 having no motive power of its own nor
capacity for cargo, tied to land and used as a ferry landing, was
held to be a maritime object, and basis for admiralty jurisdiction
when involved in an accident with a ship.
Case No. 3
In situations involving floating dredges, it has been held that
a dredge 13 opening up a channel for navigation is a vessel and is
under admiralty jurisdiction. Likewise, a steam dredge1 4 is a
vessel within the meaning of the law. As such it is subject to a
maritime lien for supplies under the law of the United States.
The absence from the dredge of power of propulsion; the fact
that she is not propelled by oars or sails; that she is flat bot-
tomed; that she is engaged in harbors, rivers, or docks, and that
she has to be moved to a distant point by means of a tug; that
she has no power of her own; that she is not and cannot be a sea-
or lake-going vessel-none of these facts nor all of them support
the conclusion that she is not a vessel.15
Another case of a steam dredge falling within admiralty
jurisdiction is seen in that it is liable for tax duties imposed by
the collector of customs. Further proof of the classification of
barges as vessels is found in The Star Buck case, 16 where a hop-
per used for dredging purposes, not fitted with oars or other
9 Kerlak v. The Pearl Jack, 79 F. Supp. 802 (D. C. Mich., 1948); Feige v.
Hurley, 89 F. 2d 575 (C. C. A. 6, 1937).
10 The General Cass, Federal Case Number 5,307 (D. C., E. D., Mich.,
June, 1871); The Robert W. Pasons, 191 U. S. 17, 30, 24 Sup. Ct. 8 (1903).
11 Disbow v. The Walsh Brothers, 36 F. 607 (1888).
12 Hezekiah Boldwin, Federal Case Number 6,449 (D. C., E. D., N. Y.,
1876); The Mackinaw, 165 F. 351 (D. C., Ore., 1908). But see below, notes
20, 22, 24.
13 Walderck v. Deal Dredge Company, 45 F. 2d 951 (C. C. A., 4, 1930).
14 The Pioneer, 30 F. 206 (D. C., E. D., N. Y., 1886).
15 The International, 89 F. 489 (C. C. A. 3, 1898); Ellis v. U. S., 206 U. S.
246 (1907).
16 The Star Buck, 61 F. 502 (D. C., E. D. Penn., 1894); The Steam Dredge
No. 6, 222 F.,576 (S. D. N. Y., 1916), aff'd 241 F. 69 (C. C. A. 2, 1917).
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means of propulsion, and generally moved by towing, was held
to be a ship. This is further supported by the Atlantic case,'
17
mentioning dredges and scows, towboats and barges.
Case No. 4
Cases involving Floating Dry Docks have held that these
are not constructed nor used for purposes of navigation or com-
merce.' 8 A dry dock, for example, was likened to a stage which
was designed to be used in connection with painting or repairing
the side of a vessel, which floated on the water, rising and falling
with the tide.' 9 Thus floating dry docks are not within the
definition of a vessel.20 It has also been held that they are not
proper subjects for salvage.21 It was pointed out that a fixed
structure such as a dry dock is not used for the purposes of
navigation, and is not a subject of salvage service any more than
is a wharf or a warehouse when projecting into or upon the
water. The mere fact that it floats on the water does not make
it a ship or vessel, and no structure that is not a ship or vessel
ordinarily is a subject of salvage.22 The court pointed out that a
fixed structure, designed for the purpose of taking ships out of
water in order to repair them, and for no other purpose, could
not possibly fall under jurisdiction of admiralty. This would not
relieve the liability of the owner if the floating dry dock was to
break away from its mooring lines and collide with another
craft while adrift. Under such circumstances the courts have
ruled the structure to be a vessel.
Case No. 5
A libel involving a large houseboat, without motive power
and without rudder, was held to be within admiralty jurisdiction.
The craft had been tied up for a period of four years and had not
during this time been dismantled in any way or put to any other
17 The Atlantic, 53 F. 607. (D. C., So. Car., 1893); North American Dredging
Co. v. Pacific Mail S. S. Co., 185 F. 698 (C. C. A. 9, 1911).
18 Snyder v. A Floating Dock, 22 F. 685 (D. C., N. J., 1884); The Wayfield,
120 F. 847 (E. D., N. Y., 1903).
19 Berton v. Tietyen & Lang Dry Dock Co., 219 F. 763 (D. C., N. J., 1915).
20 But see above, n. 12.
21 Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co. (Ap. from C. C. E. D. La. Argued Dec. 6,
1886. Decided Jan. 10, 1887); U. S. v. Bruse Dry Dock Co., 65 F. 2d 938
(C. C. A. 5, 1933).
22 But see above, n. 12.
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use. It was consequently purchased for the purpose of naviga-
tion. The court ruled that during the time the houseboat was
tied up it still retained its identity as a vessel.23
Case No. 6
A floating crane24 which was mounted on a pontoon and was
shaped like a ship, with decks but no engine (except for the en-
gine which worked the crane) was held not to be a vessel for
the purposes of admiralty jurisdiction. The pontoon was per-
manently chained to a staging and to some old warships. Com-
munication between the shore and the structure was by means
of a gangway. It appeared that the pontoon with the crane on it
had been for years permanently in this position and had been em-
ployed for lifting guns and ammunition, and for raising sunken
submarines. It could have been moved, however, by tugs. A
staff, called "the crew," manned the crane. Although the pon-
toon was capable of movement, movement was the exception
rather than the rule. The apparent permanence of the crane
invoked the decision of the court that it was not a vessel. This
conflicts directly with the American holding regarding a floating
ferry pontoon-stage mentioned above.25
Admiralty Jurisdiction in Air Law
Prior to the middle 192 0's, several schools of thought empha-
sized different opinions as to the method and execution of au-
thority to regulate air commerce. There were those who felt that
Congress should be given full command by the passage of an
amendment to the federal Constitution. Another group urged
usage of the interstate commerce clause, disregarding the fact
that each state would cast the decisive ballot when air commerce
applied to intrastate action. Still another group urged the ap-
plication of the admiralty clause of the constitution.
Conventions at Warsaw and Poland, held in 1929 and 1933
respectively, met to discuss, and draw up rulings regarding,
international aerial law. In particular, the Warsaw Convention
provided for: (a) form, contents and legal effect of transporta-
23 Kilb v. Menke, 121 F. 2d 1013 (C. C. A. 5, 1941).
24 Mr. Justice Roche in Merchant Marine Company, Ltd. v. North of
England Protecting and Indemnity Association, London, The Times, July
21, 1926.
25 At n. 12.
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tion documents; (b) liability of a carrier and his defenses; (c)
limitation of a carrier's liability; (d) venue for bringing suit,
and time limitation; (e) liability of combined, and connected
carriers. The question of application of "vessel" status to air-
craft was not settled.
The Rome Convention attempted to make uniform the rules
of liability for damage caused by aircraft to third parties. The
United States has signed but not yet ratified these provisions.
Again, "vessel" status is left uncertain.
The followers of the admiralty theory stressed many con-
vincing similarities and differences between water and air craft.
Thus, airships engage in aerial navigation, take to the air under
the guidance of pilots, and are required to abide by such rules as
the display of colored navigation lights analogous to those of
water craft. Furthermore, the registration and nationality of
aircraft, the requirements as to their log books, flag, protection,
prevention of collision, and airmen (crews), bear a striking
resemblance to the rules applicable to ships.
However, this theory did not influence the action of Congress.
This law-making organization chose to base its action on the
Interstate Commerce Clause, and thus theoretically ended the
debate.
Jurisdiction over a libel in rem for repairs to a seaplane
has been declined on the ground that aircraft are neither of the
land nor of the sea. Thus, not being of the sea, not restricted in
their activities to navigable waters, they are not maritime.26 The
seaplane, however, is substantially a flying boat, and often is
used as an instrumentality of overseas commerce and of naval
warfare, being designed to go upon the surface of the water as
well as over it. While afloat on navigable waters, it was said
by the Common Law Court in 1921 to be subject to admiralty,
because location and function stamp it as a means of water
transportation.27 Subsequently, the Air Commerce Act of 192628
expressly provided that a seaplane should not be deemed a
"vessel" for the purposes of any of the statutes regulating vessels.
It should be noted that the Act does not go so far as to deny the
existence of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction generally over
26 Cushing v. Smith, 119 Misc. 294, 196 N. Y. Supp. 241, 1928 U. S. Av. R.
73 (App. Div., 3rd Dept., 1922).
27 1928 U. S. Av. R. 4.
28 49 U. S. Code 176.
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aircraft actually navigating or at rest on navigable waters. It
has been held in Scotland that a seaplane is not a vessel, and
hence a salvor of valuable cargo from a wrecked plane was denied
salvage.2 9 Parliament shortly thereafter expressly extended the
principle of maritime salvage to aircraft and their cargoes in
distress upon navigable waters,30 and the Irish Free State did
likewise.3 1 Justice Cardozo judicially determined the status of
seaplanes in the case of Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Service
Corporation.32
Vessels in navigable waters are within the jurisdiction of
admiralty, since any structure used, or capable of being used, for
transportation upon water is a vessel. Admiralty has jurisdiction,
though the structure is airplane and seaplane combined, when the
ship falls within the definition of admiralty. More specifically,
an airplane is a vessel and under the jurisdiction of admiralty
law when it is in the fulfillment of its functions as a traveler on
water and has put aside its functions and capacities as a traveler
through air.
This decision applies to seaplanes and amphibians, when the
latter seek waterways for landing, rather than land. The court
referred with approval to a federal decision of 1914 stating that
an ordinary land plane, incapable of using water as an adequate
landing area, which had fallen into a bay, was not subject to
admiralty jurisdiction for the purpose of salvage.3 3 This decision
has been supported by the Air Commerce Act.
Further qualification of a seaplane as a vessel was demon-
strated when a claimant was employed to care for a seaplane
that was resting on navigable waters. The plane began to drag
anchor, and when the claimant attempted to turn the plane by
wading into the water, he was injured by the propeller. Justice
Cardozo determined that the plane was a vessel and fell within
the jurisdiction of admiralty, while it thereby was excluded from
the authority of the New York Industrial Commission.
29 R. C. A. Victor Co. v. Watson, 50 Lloyds List. L. Rep. 77, 1935 A. M. C.
1251 (Scotland).
30 (British) Air Navigation Act 1936, 1 Edw. 8, C. 44, 1937 U. S. Av. R., 415;
1939 U. S. Av. R. 259.
81 (Irish) Air Navigation Act 1936, Public Statute of the Oirachtas, No. 40
of 1936, Part VII.
32 Reinhart v. Newport Flying Service Corp., 232 N. Y. 115, 133 N. E. 371,
18 A. L. R. 1324 (1921).
33 The Crawford Brothers, No. 2, 215 F. 269 (D. C., Wash., 1914).
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In the case of Archin fuer Luftrecht, a seaplane enroute to an
island broke a propeller and came down on water near its
destination. A passing ship towed the invalid seaplane without
transferring passengers. Because of choppy waters, the damaged
plane capsized and many of its inhabitants died. To prevent
future disasters, the foreign admiralty court made recommenda-
tions and findings. It concluded that a seaplane, whether it
voluntarily or involuntarily lands on water, is a ship, unless it
is already a wreck when it reaches the water.3 4
In the case of Watson v. R. C. Victor Co., Inc.,3 5 a seaplane
was forced to land on water, before reaching its destination. The
passengers sent out a signal for help, but before it came, they
perished from exposure. The Lord Talbot, the rescuing fishing
boat, recovered a valuable camera, part of the supplies of the
unfortunate seaplane, that was abandoned on a nearby island.
The Lord Talbot submitted a salvage claim, but was refused
salvage by the Sheriff's Court of Aberdeen, Scotland, on the
ground that no salvage service was rendered, for the reason that
the property saved from destruction was not part of a ship's
cargo, the seaplane not being considered a ship. The court
stressed that the main purpose of a seaplane is to take to the air,
and that its water navigability is immaterial. The Merchants'
Shipping Act defined a vessel as any ship or boat "used in
navigation" and it was determined that a seaplane was not used
in navigation within the meaning of these terms.36
Development in aircraft has advanced rapidly with the per-
fection and use of jet propulsion and guided missiles. Admiralty
laws with respect to these new craft must open a new field; so
new that no decisions have been found on this matter, as yet.
It will be interesting to learn, for instance, whether or not
rockets launched from ships or submarines are "vessels," and
subject to admiralty jurisdiction.
34 54, 2 J. Air Law, 588, 590 (1935).
35 50 L. 1, L. R. 77 Great Britain, Aberdeen Sheriff Court, October 31, 1935;
1935 U. S. Av. Rep. 147.
36 See also, Sweeney, Is Special Aviation Liability Legislation Essential?,
19 J. Air L. & Com. 166 (1952).
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